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purpose of avoiding the death penalty. The prosecuting attorney
testified that he had never heard a better summation than that given
by Sims.
In rejecting the Wedding approach to effective assistance of
counsel the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
The result of such an interpretation would be to give any ... pris-
oner a hearing after his conviction in order to air his charges against
the attorney who formerly represented him. It is well known that
the drafting of petitions for habeas corpus has become a game in
many penal institutions. Convicts are not subject to the deterrents
of prosecution for perjury and contempt of court which affect ordin-
ary litigants. The opportunity to try his former lawyer has its un-
doubted attraction to a disappointed prisoner. In many cases there
is no written transcript and so he has a clear field for the exercise
of his imagination. He may realize that his allegations will not be be-
lieved but the relief from monotony offered by a hearing in court is
well worth the trouble of writing them down. To allow a prisoner
to try the issue of the effectiveness of his counsel under a liberal
definition of that phrase is to give every convict the privilege of open-
ing a Pandora's box of accusations which trial courts near large penal
institutions would be compelled to hear.
13
As Judge Stewart said for himself and two others in a dissent in
Wedding, "One fair trial is all the law prescribes for any man. Ap-
pellant has had his."'
4
Paul F. Guthrie
CONsTrrurIoNAL LAw--EQuAL POTECmON IN JuRy SELEcnON.- The
petitioner, a nineteen-year-old Negro, was indicted for the rape of a
seventeen-year-old white girl in Talladega County, Alabama. In this
small county tventy-six per cent of the males over twenty-one are
Negro, yet no Negro has sat on a petit jury for at least the last
twelve years.' Eight Negroes were selected for the jury venire, two
of whom were exempt from service, and the remaining six were ex-
cluded by the Alabama jury strike system, 2 the petitioner, therefore,
upon conviction challenged the constitutionality of the state's trial
'3 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 889 (1945).
14 394 S.W.2d at 109.
' The Supreme Court disagreed as to the period of exclusion. The majority
accepted twelve years, 380 U.S. 202, 205, while the dissent accepted testimony
that no living person could remember when a Negro sat on the petit jury. 380
U.S. 202, 231.
The Alabama jury strike system, which was adopted in 1907, permits each
opposing counsel to alternate in striking jurors without cause until twelve remain
from the original petit jury venire of one hundred men less those jurors struck
for cause. 380 U.S. 202, 210.
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procedure. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.3
Certiorari was granted.4 Held: Affirmed. The majority, composed of
Justices White, Clark, Stewart, and Brennan, held: (1) that a show-
ing of evidence that an identifiable group which is underrepresented
on the jury venire by as much as ten per cent over a twelve year
period does not present a prima facie case of systematic discrimination
and (2) that in a particular case, the prosecutor's use of the Alabama
jury strike system to eliminate all members of the petitioner's race
from the petit jury does not violate the fourteenth amendment. Jus-
tice Black concurred in the result only. Justice Harlan concurred in
the disposition of the first two issues but refused to consider the
third issue. The Chief Justice, Justice. Goldberg, and Justice Douglas
dissented. The remaining four Justices for the purpose of providing
guidelines for future cases decided as dictum that a showing that
no Negro has served on a petit jury in Talladega County for the past
twelve years without evidence as to when, how often, and under
what circumstances the prosecutor alone struck Negros from the jury
does not constitute a prima facie case of systematic exclusion. Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1964).
This timely decision raises important consideration in three dif-
ferent areas: the constitutionality of disparity in representaton, the
peremptory challenge-equal protecton conflict in a particular case
and in a series of cases in the same county, and the "state action"
doctrine.
The Constitutionality of Disparity in Representation
Justice White, speaking for the majority, rejected the petitioner's
assertion that if a showing of complete and total exclusion of Negroes
from grand and petit juries for a long period of time presents a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination, 5 then a showing of a dis-
parity of ten per cent over a twelve year period should likewise
evince a prima facie case of discrimination. This argument is not
-new. In similar situations the Court has held that under the equal
protection clause an accused, who is indicted by a grand jury or tried
by a petit jury, is guaranteed the right to a trial by a jury from which
members of his race or color have not been excluded,6 have not been
tokenly included,7 or have not been limited to the same number
a275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 368 (1963).
4377 U.S. 915 (1964).
5 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1934).
6 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880).
7 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
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each time,8 solely because of their race or color. However, the Court,
in its wisdom, has not gone so far as to require a pro rata share of
members of the accused's race or color on the jury venire.9 In Swain
the Court once again refused to play the numbers game,10 for it
does not want to assume the role of the super-selector of jurors for
the nation's trial courts. This is a particularly sound policy because
an application of an inflexible numerical formula would unnecessarily
restrict the state's power over its administration of justice inasmuch as
the states would lose their control over both intentional acts of dis-
crimination and good faith efforts which result in discrimination.
However, this does not mean that the Court will never intervene.
In Speller v. Allen" the Court stated that they would not overrule
the discretion of the trial court "so long as the source of the jury
list reasonably reflects a cross section . . ."2 of the community.
The Peremptory Challenge-Equal Protection Conflict
Unlike other jury selection cases, the state, in Swain, has a statu-
tory privilege to discriminate, not in a racial manner, but by select-
ing only a group of individuals, given their attendant affiliations,
who are least likely to be biased.' 3 However, this procedure is sub-
ject to the limitations imposed by the equal protection clause. Al-
though all the Justices would reverse the case if the statutory priv-
ilege so clearly abused the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment, they disagree as to whether or not there is a supremacy
question. Both the majority and the dissent base their approaches
on their own concepts of federalism, the proper relationship of the
individual to the state, the need for judicial protection of the rights
of individuals, the purpose and function of the peremptory chal-
lenge, and the role of the equal protection clause in state trial
procedures. Since this is not a proper case in which all could agree
whether the state or the individual should prevail, both the ma-
jority and the dissent adopt different evidentiary procedures to reach
their results.
8 Cassel v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1949).
9 Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909).
10 Speller v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), upheld selection with underrepre-
sentation of twenty-one per cent which was obtained by talcing the persons who
paid the highest amount of property tax first; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953), upheld underrepresentation of six to nine per cent on grand jury and
five to seven per cent on petit jury venire which was selectedby'use of I.B.M.
machines.
11 Speller v. Allen, supra note 10, at 474.
r2 Iid.
13 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1964).
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With respect to this conflict in a particular case, the Court has
never before decided teh question, although it did deny certiorari
to review a District of Columbia case which held constitutional the
exclusion of nineteen Negroes from a petit jury through the use of
the peremptory challenge.14 The Swain Court had little difficulty in
disposing of this point. In reliance upon past decisions, the Court
reasoned that systematic exclusion could not be proved on the
strength of one case.15 However, the Court did not satisfactorily
reconcile the conflict when the peremptory system has the effect of
eliminating all Negroes from serving on any petit jury in a given
county for at least twelve years. First, the majority's approach at the
outset was to state that the appellate briefs were inadequate as to
when, how often, and under what circumstances the prosecutor alone
was responsible for excluding Negroes from the jury over the period
in question. 16 Justice Goldberg, speaking for the dissent, in the ab-
sence of adequate facts, was willing to take judicial notice of the
1961 Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, "Jus-
tice 103," which cited instances of much discrimination in the selec-
tion of juries, in order to place the issue before the bench. Second,
because the state controls the allegedly discriminatory machinery,
the dissent applied the same evidentiary procedure used in the
selection of jury venire cases. The petitioner has the burden to show
the state's discrimination except when he presents a prima facie case
by showing the complete and total exclusion of Negroes from all
grand or petit jury service for a long period of time.' 7 Justice Gold-
berg defined the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case
in accordance with the test set out in Hernandez v. Texas.'5 The
majority made a valid distinction in rejecting the applicability of the
jury-venire-evidence test to the petit jury in stating that the basis
of selection is different. While in venire selections the jury commis-
sioners emphasize the qualifications of individuals without regard to
race membership, in the seating of jurors the court places great
emphasis on any common relationship the juror may have with the
14 Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 853, reh. denied, 335 U.S. 839 (1948).
15 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1964).
16 Id. at 227.
17 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 466 (1947).
18 Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1947), "Where discrimination is
said to occur -in the selection of veniremen by state jury commissioners, proof
that Negroes constitute a substantial segment of the population, that some
Negroes were qualified to serve as jurors, and that none had been called for
jury service over an extended period of time constitute(s) prima facie proof
of the systematic exculsion of Negroes from jury service.'
[Vol. 54,
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accused.' Third, the majority found that the history of the peremp-
tory challenge supported the fact that it provides the necessary func-
tion of guaranteeing a fair trial to both the defendant and the state.
20
The dissent, on the other hand, found that the same history indi-
cates that it was primarily used for the protection of the defendant.
1
Thus, the above mentioned approaches demonstrate the apparently
irreconciliable positions of the Justices. The majority, whose pri-
mary interest is to assure justice in the individual trial, fears the
destruction of the peremptory challenge by requiring the state to
show cause on appeal for any given exclusion, whereas the dissent,
whose major concern is the development of a control policy to stop
what it considers unconstitutional exclusion of Negroes from juries,
fears the continuance of state discrimination in a long series of trials
in violation of the equal protection clause.
22
A New Twist to the State Action Doctrine
In an attempt to undercut the dissents position, the majority
reasoned that Justice Goldberg's prima facie test alleging "state
action" applies only to situations where state officers are wholly re-
sponsible for the systematic discrimination 3 To assert that the
prosecutor's and the petitioner's counsel's discrimination against
Negroes cannot violate the fourteenth amendment, is to deny the
existence of the basic concept of the equal protection clause-permis-
sible private discrimination contradistinguished from impermissible
state discrimination. In equal protection cases the dispositive ques-
tion has always been whether the supporting action of the state con-
verts private discrimination into impermissible "state action." In con-
trast the Swain majority asserted that private discrimination converts,
otherwise impermissible "state action" into permissible action by the
state. This approach runs counter to the recent trend in "state ac-
tion" cases. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority2 4 the Supreme
Court held that where the state's inaction permits a private restaurant
19 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, at 226-227 (1964). Hence, if the
defendant is a Medean, the majority asserts that it is necessary that the state
have the right to exclude all Mexican jurors first without the requirement to show
cause.
20 Id. at 219.
21 Id. at 242.
22 The dissent did not argue that the verdict should be reversed because the
twelve men, who were selected by the allegedly unconstitutional means, did not
try the case fairly.
23 380 U.S. at 227. The prosecutor gave uncontroverted testimony that he
not only excluded Negro jurors first, but that he cooperated in advance with
defendant's counsel many times to strike Negroes first. 380 U.S. at 224-25.
24 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
1966]
KENTUCKY LAw JOuRNAL
under state lease on public property to discriminate against Negroes,
the state is involved significantly enough to violate the fourteenth
amendment.25 Certainly, upon detached reflection, the majority would
not permit the state to jointly discriminate against the Negro in the
public courtroom if the discrimination is done in an unconstitutional
manner.
In conclusion, Swain appears to add little to the development of
the body of law in jury selection cases, other than the approaches
taken by the Justices. However, Swain v. Alabama if it is to mean
anything, points out the Court's inability to apply the 1880 doctrine
of Strauder v. West Virginia26 to the 1966 pressures for non-dis-
criminatory selection of jurors. The Strauder Court held that only an
accused, who has a member of his race or color discriminated against
in the selection of the jury, solely because of his race or color, is
denied equal justice under the law.27 Since Strauder is outdated,28
it unnecessarily divided the Court into irreconciliable positions. It
forced the dissent to destroy a sound trial procedure in order to
protect the Negro from future total exclusion from petit juries.
Assuming that the peremptory challenge does have real value, in
this respect the real injustice is not when a Negro is excluded from
trying a Negro, but when Negroes are excluded from trying Cau-
casians solely because of their race. In the latter case the peremp-
tory challenge should not be permitted to shield unconstitutional
"state action," for there is no common interest between Negro and
Caucasian which justifies the striking of Negroes without cause.
Yet, Strauder denies standing to a Caucasian to present this issue
before the Court. Under a broader Strauder theory reconciliation
through accommodation is possible. In criminal cases in which a
Negro injures a Caucasian, the burden of proof that the state used
its jury strike system in an unconstitutional manner should remain
on the petitioner. But in cases in which a Caucasian injures a Caucas-
ian or a Negro injures a Negro, the petitioner's showing of complete
and total exclusion from a petit jury for a reasonable period of time
'should present a prima facie case of state discrimination. Then
the state should have to show that it has not used its peremptory
challenge apparatus in violation of the fourteenth amendment. In
the absence of a strong showing of empirical data which conclusively
demonstrates that members of one race are less able to serve as
25 See, Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), for further development of the concept of
state involvement to a significant extent.
26100 U.S. 303 (1880).
27 Id. at 310.
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jurors than members of another race in a particular case, Strauder
should be extended either by statute or. judicial interpretation to pre-
vent states from infringing upon the prospective Negro juror's four-
teenth amendment right not to be discriminated against because of
race in the selection of juries.
Larry A. Neuman
F, L= LAw-CHrD CusToDY-PtoMiscurry. - A mother who had
been granted a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treat-
ment was awarded custody and control of her two infant children.
Thereafter, the mother secured employment and immediately became
attracted to a co-worker. After a short courtship, she became pregnant,
whereupon the newly-found paramour divorced his wife to marry her.
However, a week before his divorce was to be granted, the mother
and lover began to live together as man and -wife, keeping the two
children. When this situation was brought to the attention of the
father of the children, he attempted to have the couple arrested for
adultery; however, they moved to Virginia to avoid prosecution. In
Virginia, they entered into a marriage, which was void because the
lover's divorce was not final. The couple later legally married on the
same day the divorce decree was finalized. Armed with this evidence,
the father of the two children secured a judgement from the Harlan
Circuit Court transferring the custody and control of his two children
to himself. The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Held:
Reversed. Jones v. Sulton, 388 S.W.2d 596 (Ky. 1965).
In its efforts to determine in whose custody and control the wel-
fare of the children could better be served, the court declared the
following to be the proper interpretation of promiscuity: "Promiscuity
is not an isolated incident of sexual relations with one particular
person, but denotes an indiscriminate grant of physical favors to per-
sons of the opposite sex without any requirement of love."' In hold-
ing that appellee had not proved appellant to be a promiscuous
woman, the court stated further: "We have held in many cases that
although the mother has been indiscreet with a man she married
shortly after her divorce, such indiscretions do not necessarily brand
2 8 The original purpose of Strauder was to use the equal protection clause
to prevent states from denying a Negro a fair trial by his peers. 100 U.S. 303,
309. In a pluralistic society "peers" no longer means just a member of the ac-
cused's race. In any given case if the accused can show that he'was denied a
fair trial by his peers as a result of the exclusion of a member of any race from
I Jones v. Sutton, 388 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Ky. 1965).
his jury, he should have the standing to appeal the decision.
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